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LEGISLATION
Antitrust and the Newspapers
A Comment on S. 1312
John J. Flynn*
I.

INTRODUCTION

The American newspaper industry, often called "The Fourth
Estate," apparently believes it has fallen on hard times. The aristocrats
of the Fourth Estate, the daily newspapers, came to the Ninetieth
Congress seeking a boon: relaxation of the rigors of antitrust policy as
applied to mergers and joint agency operations by otherwise competing
newspapers. A bill has been introduced, S. 1312, which is sponsored by
fifteen Senators of diverse political and economic views, all save one
having one thing in common-the presence of newspaper joint agency
operations in their home states.' The very fact that Senators of such
conflicting viewpoints could be brought together on an issue surely
indicates that America's Fourth Estate has political power far in excess
of that normally associated with aristocracies in a democracy.
Consequently, the political facts of life with regard to the power of
newspaper publishers over the political fortunes of their communities
suggest that S. 1312 is a bill that cannot be treated as special interest
legislation which one might expect to see shunted aside in the committee
process after a pro forma performance for the benefit of constituents.
Happily, the Fourth Estate includes enough independent and responsible
publishers who are concerned with the broad responsibilities of the press
and the deeper implications of a free press so that there has been ample
debate upon the pros and cons of S. 1312.
*

Associate Professor of Law, College of Law, University of Utah, B.S. Boston College,

LL.B. Georgetown University, S.J.D. University of Michigan.
I. S. 1312, 90th Cong., Ist Sess. (1967) was introduced by: Senators Hayden (D.) and Fannin
(R.) of Arizona (joint agency in Tucson); Senator Kuchel (R.) of California (joint agency in San
Francisco); Senators Hartke (D.) and Bayh (D.) of Indiana (joint agencies in Evansville and Fort
Wayne); Senators Bennett (R.) and Moss (D.) of Utah (joint agency in Salt Lake City); Senators
Fong (R.) and Inouye (D.) of Hawaii (joint agency in Honolulu); Senators Monroney (D.) and
Harris (D.) of Oklahoma (joint agency in Tulsa); Senator Randolph (D.) of West Virginia (joint

agency in Charleston); Senator Scott (R.) of Pennsylvania (joint agencies in Franklin-Oil City
and Pittsburgh); Senator Thurmond (R.) of South Carolina (no joint agencies in South Carolina);
and, Senator Tower (R.) of Texas (joint agency in El Paso).
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S. 1312

The statistical history of the American newspaper industry provides
some insight into the reason for the current attempt by some of the press
to shed their mantle of rugged individualism and seek to relax the rule of
competition in the industry. Newspapers witnessed a spectacular growth
in the latter half of the nineteenth century and the early twentieth
century.' In total numbers, circulation and revenues of daily and weekly
newspapers achieved phenomenal growth between 1850 and 1910. In
1850 there were 254 daily newspapers with a total circulation of
758,000. 3 By 1890, there were a total of 1,610 dailies with a total
circulation of 8,387,000. In 1909, there were 2,600 daily newspapers with
a total circulation of 24,212,000.1 Thereafter, the total number of daily
newspapers gradually declined while total circulation continued its
steady growth. In 1920, there were 2,042 dailies with a total circulationof 27,790,656; in 1940, 1,878 dailies with a total circulation of
41,131,611;1 in 1960, 1,763 dailies with a total circulation of 58,882,000;6
and, in 1965, there were 1,751 dailies with a total net paid circulation of
60,358,000.1 Thus, while total circulation and revenues have been
steadily increasing, the total number of dailies has been steadily
decreasing. Between 1940 and 1965 the total number of morning dailies
declined from 380 to 320, and during the same period the total number
of evening dailies fell from 1,498 to 1,444Y Only Sunday newspapers
have shown a growth in total numbers during this period-from 525 to
578.1
A superficial glance at these statistics and the realization that
population, literacy, and affluence have been steadily increasing might
suggest that the decline of the total number of daily newspapers is
inexplicable. Inherent economic factors, competition of other media,
and business practices especially peculiar to the newspaper industry,
however, make the decline of the total number of dailies, in the face of
increased circulation and revenues, understandable if not defensible.
2. See generally

KREPS, THE NEWSPAPER

INDUSTRY,

THE STRUCTURE OF AMERICAN

509 (2rd ed. 1961); Note, Local Monopoly In the Daily Newspaper Industry, 61 YALE
L.J. 948 (1952). For an excellent survey of the growth and concentration of all major forms of mass
INDUSTRY

communication media, see B. W. RUCKERTHE FIRST FREEDOM (1968).
3. HISTORICAL STATISTICS OF THE UNITED STATES, COLONIAL TIMES TO 1957, at 500 (1957).
4.
5.
6.
7.

Id.
Id.

8.

Id.

9.

Id.

STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES

Id.

1957, at 519 (1957).
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Inherent economic factors make modern, daily newspaper
publishing an expensive process. Capital cost outlays in fixed assets for
a modern, metropolitan, daily newspaper are quite high,1" in part at least
because of the relative technological backwardness and oligopolistic
control of the production equipment business. Newsprint has shown a
steady and rigid increase in price,'" and wages have also been subject to
steady increase, even though newspapers are still probably the largest
employers of child labor in the form of "Hbratio Alger" type newspaper
boys.' 2 Although newspapers continually fight to maintain the illusion
10. Estimates of plant replacement costs and start-up costs for a major metropolitan
newspaper vary considerably, depending upon the location, size of the newspaper, and technology
adopted. Replacement costs for the Newspaper Agency Corporation of Salt Lake City, which prints
two dailies of over 100,000 circulation each, were estimated to exceed $7,000,000. Hearingson S.
1312 BeJbre the Subconun. on Antitrust and Monopoly of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,90th
Cong., Ist Sess. pt. 2, at 879 (1967) (statement of J. W. Gallivan) [hereinafter cited as Hearings]. A
paper was started in McAlister, Oklahoma, with a circulation of 8,500 and a photo offset cost of
$150,000. I Hearings at 379 (statement of Gene Stipe). William D. Rinehart, Assistant General
Manager of the American Newspaper Publisher's Ass'n (ANPA) Research Institute, presented a
general description of the technology available for new newspapers and its costs. See 2 Hearings788,
809.
The exact status of the desirability, utility, and cost of equipment to operate a newspaper were
never clearly settled in the hearings. Some witnesses argued that improved technology and an
inproved labor relations policy could substantially lower the start-up costs for new newspapers. 2
Hearings 936-53 (statement of Dr. Harry Kelber); 2 Hearings 953-87 (statement of John R.
Malone); 3 Hearings 1253-64 (statement of the International Typographical Union (ITU)). See
also CoMiN. ON FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, A. FREE AND RESPONSIBLE PRESS 30-37 (1947) (reprinted in
3 Hearings 1124-31).
It is interesting to note that the Report of the Royal Commission on the Press 1947-1949,
perhaps the most thorough examination of the newspaper industry undertaken by any country,
generally concluded that the greatest barriers to entry in the newspaper industry were finding a sure

and reasonably priced supply of newsprint and achieving a stable and adequate number of
advertisers early in the life of the new venture. REPORT OF THE ROYAL COMM. pt. 2, at 158-64.
II. The major cost of publishing a newspaper is newsprint. The average price per short ton of
imported newsprint has risen from $93.13 in 1950 to $124.89 in 1965. STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF
THE UNITED STATES 354 (1967). The ITU reported that newsprint costs rose 236% between 1935 and
1961 and that newsprint costs accounted for 29.7% of the income of a paper with 250,000
circulation. 3 Hearings 125 1. The price a buyer pays for a newspaper usually does not cover the cost
of the paper on which the news is printed. See 2 Hearings 876-77 (statement of J. W. Gallivan).
There have been several investigations of the newsprint industry probing pricing practices of sellers
and the purchase of newsprint plants by large newspapers and chains. See generally ELLIS,
NEWSPRINT: PRODUCERS, PUBLISHERS, POLITICAL PRESSURES (1960).

12. 2 Hearings 811-39 (testimony of the Metropolitan Route Dealers' Association). Tort
litigation over the agency or independent contractor status of "newspaper boys" has been occurring
with increasing frequency. For tort purposes, the degree of control exercised by newspapers over
their delivery boys has led to more and more courts applying respondeat superior. See generally
Annot., 52 A.L.R. 2d 287 (1957); Annot., 53 A.L.R. 2d 183 (1957); Note, The Independent
ContractorStatus of Newspaper Carriers:Some Antitrust Questions, 2 VALP. L. REV. 157 (1967).
For antitrust purposes, at least, the Supreme Court seems willing to treat newsboys and route
dealers as independent businessmen entitled to run their own business and set their own prices. See
Albrecht v. The Herald Co., 389 U.S. 910 (1968).
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that their under-age "independent contractors" are not even entitled to
minimum-wage law benefits, there can be little doubt that overall wage
costs have increased significantly.' 3
Heavy reliance upon advertising for revenue has also influenced the
decline of the total number of newspapers. It is presently estimated that
up to 70 per cent of the revenue of most newspapers is realized from
advertising revenues." One estimate has been made that the subscription
rate for most newspapers does not even cover the cost of the paper
comprising the newspaper purchased.'" The discerning reader of almost
any daily newspaper may already have realized this fact of modern
newspaper publishing simply by glancing at the daily offering served up
for a dime. Many dailies are 70 per cent advertising, and the cynic might
suggest that newspapers are not "news" papers; rather, they are
"advertising" papers with news features inserted here and there. Even the
30 per cent of a modern daily paper devoted to "news" cannot justify
calling a newspaper a "news" paper unless one includes comic strips,
advice to the lovelorn, canned editorials, and the remaining smorgasbord
of "features" within the definition of "news. 16
13. The average wage of production workers in the newspaper industry has risen from $2.88
per hour in 1960 to $3.44 per hour in 1966. 'STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 227
(1967). In the Senate subcommittee hdarings, there seemed to be little debate about the claims of
non-production workers, particularly reporters, that they are woefully underpaid. I Hearings 41625 (statement of B. McNamara); I Hearings 389 (statement of Prof. W. L. Rivers). There was
considerable dispute as to the exact relationship of wages and labor practices to the vitality of the
newspaper industry. See e.g., I Hearings 196 (statement of L. M. Loeb). On this question the
ANPA presented a statement prepared initially for a 1963 house antitrust subcommittee investigation of the newspaper industry and entitled: NEWSPAPERS 1963. Those House hearings were mysteriously aborted and no trace of the proceedings has ever been found. 3 Hearings 1415-16. The
unions vigorously protested the allegations that exhorbitant wages and archaic union practices have
contributed to the demise of newspapers. 3 Hearings1244-52 (statement of ITU); 2 Hearings 936-53
(statement of Prof. H. Kelber); I Hearings387-408 (statement of Prof. W. L. Rivers). Perhaps the
only conclusion that can be drawn from this phase of the testimony is that one cannot place much
value on the self-serving statements by both sides in protracted disputes in the newspaper industry.
Labor relations in the industry are medieval, and there is a general need for an objective
investigation of labor relations practices by both management and the unions. See generally 2
Hearings953-87 (statement of J. R. Malone).
14. In 1945, 51.5% of newsprint consumption by newspapers went for advertising and 48.5
went for "other content." By 1966, 61.7% of newspaper newsprint consumption went for advertising
and 38.3% went for "other content." STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 517 (1967).
See also Id. at 518 (Newspapers-circulation and receipts: 1958 and 1963).
15.

See note II supra.

16. See I Hearings322-23 (statement of Ben. Bagdikian); Comm.ON FREEDOM OF THE PRESS,
A FREE AND RESPONSIBLE PRESS 52-59 (1947); Engberg, A Freeand Responsible Press: Where Are
They Now?, THE CENTER MAG. 22 (1967). It has been said that, "[Jiournalism has shifted emphasis
from information to entertainment, from objective debate on vital issues to partisan propaganda,
from enlightenment to comic strips."
AMERICAN INDUSTRY

KREBS, THE NEWSPAPER INDUSTRY, THE STRUCTURE OF

526-27 (3d ed. 196 1).
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Reliance upon advertising revenue has a more invidious effect,
however, than that of causing-the reader eyestrain as he hunts for the
news and feature columns in the daily newspaper. A "news" paper's
success in obtaining high advertising revenue is directly linked with the
size of the newspaper's circulation. The paper with a large circulation
can offer lower line rates per customer exposure, since the cost of setting
up the advertising is spread over a much larger base. Increments in

printing additional copies of the same advertising do not entail
additional large expenditures, since the only added costs are more ink
and newsprint and additional press time. 7 In some respects, the

interrelationship of circulation and advertising makes the newspaper
industry an industry of increasing returns. In the words of Henry

Carter Adams, an industry of increasing returns is one where the
"increment of product from an expending enterprise is greater than the

increment of capital and labor required to secure its expansion.""
Consequently, a competitor with a smaller circulation is at an inherent
competitive disadvantage, particularly with national advertisers, since

his use of mechanical equipment is less efficient and his base for
allocation of advertiser cost is narrower. Moreover, smaller circulation

and necessarily higher advertising rates make the smaller competitor less
attractive to the advertiser, since the advertiser's cost per potential
One of the underlying assumptions often stated in favor of S. 1312 is the proposition that local
affairs will be better served by two contending editorial viewpoints rather than one. The assumption
is based upon the premise that local newspapers cover local news and provide local citizens with indepth information about major problems facing the community. Aside from a few noteworthy
exceptions, this premise is patently false, since: most "news" in local papers is provided by national
wire services; most editorial comment is provided by nationally syndicated columnists or canned
editorials; and the balance of non-advertising material is directed at entertaining rather than
informing, by providing glimpses at the future through daily horoscopes for the idealists and racing
forms for the realists, advice to the lovelorn and beauty hints for the lonely, sporting news for those
who gain vicarious pleasure from identifying with athletes, comics for those who can't read, and free
advertising or adulation for those local citizens recognized as the local captains of industry or the
commercial establishment. The gradual concentration and reliance of the industry upon advertising
for revenue, thereby causing a shift to reliance upon the use of material that sells newspapers, bears a
striking resemblance to the evolution of the radio and television industry. See Cox and Johnson,
Broadcasting In America and the FCC's License Renewal Process: An Oklahoma Case Study
(Mimeo 1968).
17. In 1951 John R. Malone wrote an incisive article exploring this peculiarity of newspaper
competition. Economic-Technological Bases for Newspaper Diversity, JOURNALISM Q. (Summer
195 1, reprinted in 4 Hearings 1770. Dr. Matone predicted that the inevitable consequence of the
present form of newspaper competition and technology'would be further concentration of the
industry. His analysis has been proven correct and his testimony before the Committee proved to be
the most sophisticated and incisive testimony on the economic laws and consequences of newspaper
competition. 2 Hearings953-87.

18.

H. ADAMS,

RELATION OFTHE STATETO INDUSTRIAL ACTION

(1887).
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customer reached will necessarily increase. Consequently, heavy reliance
upon advertising for revenue, the more efficient use of advertising dollars
per exposure by advertisers, and the direct relationship between size of
circulation and the efficiency of the use of advertising dollars have all
been combined to give the larger circulation competitor an inherent
advantage in the struggle for survival. It is therefore not surprising that
the twentieth century has witnessed a gradual decline in the total number
of daily newspapers, even though newspaper circulation and revenues
have been steadily increasing.
Given the foregoing economic facts of newspaper competition, high
capital costs, difficulty of achieving market acceptance, difficulties in
establishing an efficient distribution system, and competition by other
media, it is not unusual to expect that there are high barriers to new
market entry in the newspaper business. In many areas those barriers
have been made insuperable by the following facts: restrictive practices
in the newsprint business;2: acquisition by existing papers of used
production equipment and the intangible assets of failing newspapers in
order to keep them out of the market for potential newcomers; 2'
restrictive practices in the sale of syndicated features and wire services-22
pooling a chain newspaper's resources to fight competition;' and by the
creation of joint newspaper agencies whereby existing competitors form
a new corporation to handle printing, distribution, advertising, and all
other commercial operations of their newspapers through one corporation.24 The creation of joint newspaper agency corporations has been
19. See Malone, supra note 17; 1 Hearings 41 (statement of Arthur B. Hanson); 2 Hearings
788 (statement of W. D. Rinehart). while no empirical economic research has been done on this
question, the decline of the total number of newspapers and the experience of new entrants with

artificial, as well as inherent, barriers to entry justify the conclusion that entry barriers are high,
particularly where there are existing competitors. See 2 Hearings 721-38 (statement of M. G.
Dworkin); 1 Hearings 371-85 (statement of Hon. G. Stipe). Even established newspapers have
difficulty in establishing a new newspaper in a different product market. See I Hearings 195-97
(statement of L. M. Loeb).
20. See generally L. ELLIS, NEWSPRINT: PRODUCERS, PUBLISHERS, POLITICAL PRESSURES
(1960); Note, Local Monopoly in the Daily Newspaper Industry, 61 YALE L. J. 948, 959-66 (1952).
21. 2 Hearings 973-74 (statement of J. R. Malone); I Hearings 211 (statement of W. J.
Farson).
22. United States v. Chicago Tribune-N.Y. News Syndicate, Inc., 5 TRADE RtEG. REP.
.45067 at 52, 662 (S.D.N.Y. 1967). See also I Hearings 297-308, 315-18 (statement of N. Cherniss).
23. 2 Hearings 915-35 (statement of Fred Martin); 3 Hearings 1307-43 (statement of ITU);
I Hearings 281-95 (statement of Prof. B. W. Rucker); 2 Hearings 1022-34 (statement of E.
Elfstrom).
24. I Hearings 328-69 (statement of J. Flynn); 2 Hearings 841 (statement of J. M. Cornwell);
I Hearings 249 (statement of R. McDonald); I Hearings 83 (statement of E. Mecham); 2 Hearings
634-81 (statement of J. H. Clinton).

19681

LEGISLATION

done in the name of preserving independent editorial voices in communities where there is existing competition between regularly published
newspapers. Since the first newspaper agency corporation was created in
Albuquerque in 1928,25 27 other communities have seen the creation of
agency arrangements.26 A significant portion of the industry is currently

operating under agency operations. 7
III.

THE GENESIS OF

S. 1312

On January 4, 1965, the Antitrust Division of the Justice
Department filed a civil antitrust suit to block the merger of the Arizona

Daily Star and the Tucson Daily Citizen, the two daily newspapers in
Tucson, Arizona." The suit also challenged the validity of the joint
operating agreement by which the two papers had been conducting joint
printing, advertising, and circulation operations since 1940. Similar
joint operations exist in 21 other American cities, and the prospect that
Antitrust Division success in Tucson would place the other joint
operations in jeopardy was the primary factor which produced S. 1312.9

The United States District Court for Arizona found the merger unlawful
under section 7 of the Clayton Act and held that the 1940 joint operating

agreement constituted monopolization in violation of section 2 of the
Sherman Act." The court specifically held: that the joint operation "constitutes a price fixing, profit pooling and market allocation agreement

illegal per se under Section 1 of the Sherman Act;" that the defendants
25. For a history of joint agency operations in various parts of the country, see Tassin, Daily
Newspaper Semi Mergers: A Study of Separately Owned, Editorially Competitive Newspapers
Published in Jointly Operated Printing Plants Under Unified Business Management, 1957
(unpublished M.A. thesis, U. of Okla.). The Albuquerque, N.M., and El Paso, Tex., joint agency
arrangements have served as models for many subsequent joint agency arrangements. See, e.g., I
Hearings6 (statement of W. Small).
26. Tassin, supra note 25.
27. Twenty-two cities, if Tuscon is included, have joint agency operations to varying degrees:
Birmingham, Ala.; Tucson, Ariz.; San Francisco, Cal.; Miami, Fla.; Honolulu, Hawaii; Evansville
and Fort Wayne, Ind.; Shreveport, La.; St. Louis, Mo.; Lincoln, Neb.; Albuquerque, N. M.;
Columbus, Ohio; Tulsa, Okla.; Franklin-Oil City and Pittsburgh, Pa.; Nashville and Knoxville,
Tenn.; El Paso, Tex.; Salt Lake City, Utah; Bristol, Va.; Charleston, W. Va.; and Madison, Wis.
The ITU claimed joint a'gency operations exist in 25 cities. See I Hearings 135 (statement of the
ITU). The ANPA claimed joint agencies exist in 22 cities. I Hearings 63 (statement of A. Hanson).
One witness, Roy McDonald, president and publisher of the Chattanooga News-Free Press, broke
up a joint agency in which his newspaper participated. I Hearings 249-63.
28. United States v. Citizen Publishing Co., 5 TRADE REG. REP. 45,065, at 52, 58F (D.
Ariz. 1965),-decided, 280 F. Supp. 978 (1968), prob. jur. noted, 37 U.S.L.W. 3151 (U.S. Sept. 21,

1968).
29. I Hearings 3 (statement of Hon. Carl Hayden (D-Ariz.)). See also 15 Senators Ask Law
to Okay Agency Plan, EDITOR AND PUBLISHER, March 25, 1967, at 10.
30. United States v. Citizen Publishing Co., 280 F. Supp. 978, 994 (1968).
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"acquired monopoly power over the daily newspaper business in Tucson,
in violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act;" that the defendants combined and conspired to monopolize interstate trade and commerce in
violation of section 2 of the Sherman Act; and that the government is
"entitled to a decree directing divestiture of [the] Star and modification
of the operating agreement."3
S. 1312 was introduced by fifteen senators-representing about all
schools of political thought currently found in the two major political
parties and representing states where joint newspaper arrangements have
been operating-approximately eight months before the Citizen
Publishing Company decision was handed down by the district court? A
cursory reading of the bill should demonstrate that the proponents of the
legislation were not bashful about seeking an "exemption" approaching
immunity.
Section 1 of the bill would allow the Act to be cited as the "Failing
Newspaper Act." Like "right to work" and "fair trade" legislation, the
popular name for the bill is somewhat misleading. In the case of S.1312,
the popular name of the bill infers that many newspapers are failing, that
their failure is due to inherent and uncontrollable economic factors, and
that the bill will only exempt newspapers that are failing because of
inherent and uncontrollable economic factors. The first inference
assumes a fact that never has been proved,3 the second is patently false, 4
and the third is simply not true since the bill by definition applies to more
than "failing newspapers."3 5
Section 2 of the bill, the declaration of congressional policy,
broadly states that it is the policy of the United States to preserve
31. Id. at 993.
32. The district court filed its opinion January 31, 1968, and S. 1312 was filed March 16,
1967.
33. If anything, the claims of the ANPA that the industry was never healthier and the future
never brighter were clearly established by the hearings. The AN PA's claims were made in a report
issued by the ANPA two weeks after S. 1312 was filed. See ANPA, Daily Newspapers in 1966,
Highlights of a Record Year (April 1967), reprinted in I Hearings 509-27. Essentially the same
claims were made by the ANPA in 1963 in a massive report prepared for the mysterious House
Antitrust Subcommittee Hearings on Newspapers in 1963. Although all records of the House
hearings have disappeared, the ANPA published and distributed its statement at those hearings.
ANPA, NEWSPAPERS 1963 (1963), reprinted in 3 Hearings 1407-1546. The ITU also prepared a
rassive report for the 1963 House hearings: ITU, FEDERAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR A FREE AND
COMPETITIVE PRESS (1963). reprinted in 3 Hearings 1235-1406.
34. See generally2 Hearings953-87 (statement of John R. Malone).
35. Section 3(6) of the proposed bill provides: "The term 'failing newspaper' means a
newspaper publication which, regardless of its ownership or affiliations, appears unlikely to remain
or become a financially sound publication." The gap between failing and "unlikely to remain or
become a financially sound publication" is equivalent to the gap between the incipiency standards of
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publication of newspapers in any area where a joint operating
arrangement or combination has been or may be entered into because of
"economic distress."36 The term "economic distress" is not used or
defined elsewhere in the act and promotes confusion, since it implies that
the bill embraces a broader range of newspapers in trouble than that
covered by the popular name of the bill found in section 1. Moreover, the
legal status of the legislative declaration of policy is unclear. If the
affirmative effect of a statutory declaration of policy is clear it is of aid
in determining the substantive scope and purpose of the statute." The
substantive scope and purpose of S. 1312, in light of this declaration of
policy and the exemption sections, is to cut as wide a swath of antitrust
immunity as possible for newspaper combinations formed under the
conditions stated in section 4 of the bill. But the negative implications of
the statutory declaration of policy are less clear. One implication of
section 2 of the proposed bill is that a court faced with the question of
whether state antitrust and special newspaper industry laws could be
applied to a newspaper combination formed pursuant to S. 1312 would,
in all likelihood, hold that the strong affirmative declaration of policy
found in section 2 evidences a congressional intent to pre-empt
conflicting state legislation."' If such proves to be the case, S. 13 12 would
not only override the application of most major federal antitrust laws,
but would also remove the application of state antitrust policy to
anticompetitive newspaper arrangements formed within a state's
borders. One wonders why several of the sponsors, normally supersensitiye to "states' rights," were willing to introduce a bill so obviously
destructive of independent state antitrust policy.
Sections 3 and 4 of the proposed bill, the definition section and the
operative exemption section, are the heart of the bill and are so closely
the Clayton Act and the achievement standards of the Sherman Act. Compare Brown Shoe Co. v.
United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962), with United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495 (1948).
For an examination of the various definitions of the failing company defense, see Low, The Failing
Company Doctrine: An Illusive Economic Defense Under Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 35
FORDHAM L. REV. 425,437-42 (1967).
36. Section 2 of the proposed bill provides: "In the public interest of maintaining the historic
independence of the newspaper press in all parts of the United States, it is hereby declared to be the
public policy of the United States to preserve the publication of newspapers in any city, community
or metropolitan area where a joint operating arrangement or combination has been or may be
entered into because of economic distress."
37. Campbell v. Hussey, 368 U.S. 297 (1961); San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon,
359 U.S. 236 (1959); Garner v. Teamsters Union, 346 U.S. 485 (1953); Hill v. Florida, 325 U.S. 538
.(1945); Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941).
38. 2 Hearings 892-906 (statement of Hon. Phil Hansen). See generally J. FLYNN,
FEDERALISM AND STATE ANTITRUST REGULATION

109-200 (1964).
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intertwined as to require joint examination. Section 3 (1) of the Act
defines the words "antitrust law" to include the Federal Trade
Commission Act and each statute defined by section 4 of the Federal
Trade Commission Act as an "Antitrust Act." 9 Section 4 of the
Federal Trade Commission Act defines "antitrust laws" as including the
Sherman Act, 40 the FTC Act,4 1 the Clayton Act 42 including its preNorris-LaGuardia restrictions against labor unions,"- the Wilson Tariff
Act," the Robinson-Patman Act Amendments to the Clayton Act,45 and
the Celler-Kefauver amendments to section 7 of the Clayton Act." The
dimensions of the exemption must be measured against all the major
federal antitrust laws, since section 4 states: "It shall not be unlawful
under any antitrustlaw for any person to propose, enter into, perform or
enforce," an arangement or combination exempted by the Act under the
conditions stated for the exemption. 2
The remaining definitions follow the same expansive and allinclusive course. "Newspaper owner" is defined to mean "any person
who owns or controls directly, or indirectly through separate or
subsidiary corporations, one or more newspaper publications;"'"
"person" is defined to include any individual, corporation, partnership,
39. Section 4 of the Federal Trade Commission Act does not define "Antitrust Act" but does
define "Antitrust Acts," 15 U.S.C. § 44 (1964). The definition may not include the RobinsonPatman Act and the 1950 Celler-Kefauver amendments to § 7 of the Clayton Act since § 4 refers to
the Clayton Act as originally enacted in 1914 and does not incorporate its subsequent amendments.
It might even be argued that the Robinson-Patman and Celler-Kefauver amendments to the Clayton
Act are intentionally excluded since another section of the 1938 statute, defining acts to regulate
commerce, expressly includes "[a]ll acts amendatory thereof and supplementary thereto." 15
U.S.C. § 44 (1957). Express inclusion in one section would indicate an intent to exclude from a
similar and companion section. Since newspaper joint agencies and newspaper mergers raise serious
Clayton Act § 7 questions and many newspapers charge discriminatory advertising rates, it seems
clear that the proponents of S. 1312 intended to add the Robinson-Patman Act and the CellerKefauver amendments to § 7 of the Clayton Act. The ambiguity should be removed, however, if the
bill is adopted.
40. 26 Stat. 209 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § I et seq. (1964).
41. 38Stat. 717 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 41 etseq. (1964).
42. 38 Stat. 730 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 12 et seq. (1964).
43. 29 U.S.C. § 52(4) (1964).
44. 15 U.S.C. §§ 8-11 (1964).
45. 15 U.S.C. § 13 (1964).
46. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1964).
47. Emphasis added. Section 4 of S. 1312 provides: "it shall not be unlawful under any
antitrust law for any person to propose, enter into, perform, or enforce the provisions of any
contract, agreement, or arrangement for any newspaper combination or any joint newspaper
operating arrangement if, at the time at which such contract, agreement, or arrangement is
proposed or entered into, not more than one of the newspaper publications affected by such
combination or operating arrangement is a publication other than a failing newspaper."
48. S. 1312, § 3(4).
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association or other juridical person organized under or recognized by
any state or nation; 49 and "newspaper publication" is defined to include
a "publication produced on newsprint paper which is published in one or
more issues weekly, and in which a substantial portion of the content is
devoted to the dissemination of news and editorial opinion."50 Included
among those who may avail themselves of the bill, therefore, is any
individual or legal entity owning or controlling, no matter how
indirectly, a newspaper printed at least once per week.
The key definitions of the bill are "newspaper combinations," "joint
operating arrangments," and "failing newspaper," since the exemption
is conditioned upon "not more than one of the newspaper publications
affected" by the arrangement being a "publication other than a failing
newspaper" and is limited to a "newspaper combination" or "joint
newspaper operating arrangement" as defined by the Act.5 The peculiar
negative phrasing of the condition needed to activate the exemption-that not more than one of the newspapers be other than a
failing newspaper-is somewhat confusing, since it seems to infer that
combinations and arrangements may only be made by one non-"failing
newspaper" and one or more "failing newspapers," but not by two or
more "failing newspapers" without a non-"failing newspaper" being
party to the combination or arrangement. The confusion should be
attributed to poor draftsmanship rather than evil design, since it seems
apparent that the drafters at least intended to foreclose the possibility of
the bill being used as a device for mergers by two or more healthy
'5 newspapers through the medium of a "failing newspaper. 2
The conditioning of a merger and joint operating arrangement upon
only the status or lack of status of a "failing newspaper" seems to
incorporate into the bill the failing company defense developed in
Clayton Act section 7 cases. The definition of "failing newspaper,"
however, is significantly broader than the vague definitions of that term
which have been developed in antitrust lore. 3 Section 3 (6) of the
49. S. 1312,§ 3(7).
50. S. 1312,§ 3(5).
51. S. 1312,§ 4.
52. I Hearings78 (statement of A. Hanson).
53. Low, supra note 35 at 437-42; Hale & Hale, Failing Firms and the Merger Provisionsof
the Antitrust Laws, 52 Ky. L.J. 597 (1964); Dept. of Justice, Antitrust Div. Merger Guidelines,
TRADE REG. REPORTS

(No. 363, June 3, 1968). The Merger Guidelines adopt the following

standards:
"A merger which the Department would otherwise challenge Mill ordinarily not be challenged if
(i) the resources of one of the merging firms are so depleted and its prospects for rehabilitation so
remote that the firm faces the clear probability of a business failure, and (ii) good faith efforts by the
failing firm have failed to elicit a reasonable offer of acquisition more consistent with the purposes
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proposed bill defines "failing newspaper" to mean "a newspaper
publication which, regardless of its ownership or affiliations, appears
unlikely to remain or become a financially sound publication." The
definition broadens the "failing company" defense, if it is a defense, 4 by:
(1) importing an incipiency test into the definition; (2) equating verbiage
foreign to the defense, "unlikely to become or remain financially sound,"
with the concept of failing; (3) excluding consideration of the other assets
of the owners or its affiliates; (4) excluding consideration of those factors
contributing to the "financial" un-"soundness" of the "failing"
newspaper; and (5) excluding investigation into the anticompetitive
effects of one firm rather than another acquiring the failing firm." In
light of such a definition it is generous to call the bill "The Failing
Newspaper Act;" it is dangerous to think that the bill is designed to
preserve the struggling and crusading editor of yesteryear whose only

devotion is to the non-commercial aspects of journalism. 6 It is ridiculous to think that the bill is anything other than an open invitation to
further concentrate an already over-concentrated industry, thereby
destroying the few remaining independent editorial voices.
The danger of the bill's vague and loophole-ridden definition of

"failing newspaper" becomes apparent upon examining the dimensions
of the exemption from all federal antitrust legislation created by the

merger and joint operating arrangement definitions in sections 3 (2) and
3 (3). "Newspaper combinations"

are defined as the merger or

of Section 7 by a firm which intends to keep the failing firm in the market. The Department regards
as failing only those firms with no reasonable prospect of remaining viable; it does not regard a firm
as failing merely because the firm has been unprofitable for a period of time, has lost market
position or failed to maintain its competitive position in some other respect, has poor management,
or has not fully explored the possibility of overcoming its difficulties through self-help.
"In determining the applicability of the above standard to the acquisition of a failing division
of a multi-market company, such factors as the difficulty in assessing the viability of a portion of a
company, the possibility of arbitrary accounting practices, and the likelihood that an otherwise
healthy company can rehabilitate one of its parts, will lead the Department to apply this standard
only in the clearest of circumstances."
54. See generally Connor, Section 7 of the Clayton Act: The "Failing Company" Myth, 49
GEO. L.J. 84 (1960).
55. See United States v. Diebold, 369 U.S. 654 (1962); Merger Guidelines, supra note 53.
56. Many newspapers are a part of a much larger chain or conglomerate corporation. For
example, the ITU reported in 1963 the vast holdings of the Chandler, Hearst and Newhouse
interests spreading across all forms of communications and related industries. See 3 Hearings 12761307. Professor Rucker described the growth of newspaper chains and newspaper ownership of A M
and FM broadcasting stations and television stations. I Hearings 283. The general shift from
performing the task of transmitting information to the role of entertaining is further evidence of the
demise of the crusading editor of yesteryear. See note 16 supra. There are still some around,
however. For a particularly good example, see the testimony of Eugene Cervi, editor and publisher
of Cervi's Rocky Mountain Journal, I Hearings25-41.
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consolidation of two or more newspaper owners, or the acquisition by
one newspaper owner, directly or indirectly, of one or more newspaper
owners by stock or asset acquisitions in whole or part. One can only
speculate as to why the draftsmen felt compelled to include a merger
provision in a bill purportedly designed to save joint operating

arrangements. The heavy involvement of some chain newspapers in joint
operating arrangements57 and the protection of consummated mergers
between newspapers in many communities, bringing total control under
one hand, seem to be the prime reasons. The retroactive effect of the bill"
and the phrasing of the exemption lend support to this speculation, since

the legality of the merger is to be judged "at the time at which such
contract, agreement, or arrangement is proposed or entered into."
Consequently, the doctrine of United States v. E.I. Dupont de Nenlours
& Co., 9 permitting attack upon a merger many years after its
consummation, would not be available for attacking newspaper mergers
if the merger met the lax standards of S. 1312 at the time it was proposed or entered into. Thus, subsequent changes in market conditions,

the rehabilitation of the failing firm, technological changes making it
possible for a second and independent paper to exist in the same market,
and the anticompetitive effects of the merger occurring in subsequent
years could not lift the veil of antitrust immunity if at the time the
merger was "proposed or entered into[,] not more than one of the

newspaper publications affected by such combination or operating
arrangement is a publication other than a failing newspaper."
57. For example, the Scripps-Howard chain is involved in joint agency arrangements in
Albuquerque, N. M.; El Paso, Tex.; Evansville, Ind.; Birmingham, Ala.; Knoxville, Tenn.;
Columbus, Ohio; and Pittsburgh, Pa. I Hearings 265 (statement of J. Howard). Merger trends in
the newspaper industry are a substantial cause for concern. For a survey of recent events, see
Flackett, Newspaper Mergers: Recent Events in Britain and the United States, 12 ANTITRUST
BULL. 1033 (1967).
58. S. 1312, § 5 provides: "(a) Any civil action in any district court of the United States in
which a final judgment or decree has been entered, under which a newspaper combination or a joint
newspaper operating agreement has been held to be unlawful under any antitrust law shall be
reopened and reconsidered upon application made to such court within ninety days after the date of
enactment of this Act by any party to the contract, agreement, or arrangement by which such
combination or operating agreement was placed in effect, whether or not such party was a party to
such action. Upon the filing of any such application with respect to any such action, any final
judgment or decree theretofore entered therein shall be vacated by the court. The provisions of
section 4 shall apply to the determination of such action by such court upon such reconsideration.
(b) The provisions of section 4 shall apply to the determination of any civil or criminal action
pending in any district court of the United States on the date of enactment of this Act in which it is
alleged that any such combination, or any such operating agreement, is unlawful under any antitrust
law."
59. 353 U.S. 586 (1957). See generally The Backward Sweep Theory and the Oligopoly
Problem 32 ABA ANTITRUST L.J. 306 (1967) (special report to the ABA Antitrust Law
Subcommittee on § 7 of the Clayton Act).
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"Joint newspaper operating arrangement" is defined to allow any
or all combined activity and to involve every commercial aspect of the
newspaper business. rhe definition sanctions combined activity for any
one or combination of the following aspects of newspaper publication:
(1)"joint or common facilities for publication;" (2) "unified operations
for the performance of one or more of the following functions: printing,
distribution, advertising and circulation solicitation, and bookkeeping;"
and (3) "joint or common establishment of advertising rates, circulation
rates, and revenue distribution.""0 In effect, therefore, "joint newspaper
arrangements" is so defined by the bill as to permit a partial or total
merger of all commercial phases of newspaper operations without the
necessity of a formal merger, if at the time the arrangement "is proposed
or entered into, not more than one of the newspaper publications affected
by such combination or operating arrangement is a publication other
than a failing newspaper." The dimensions of the exemption approach
total immunity from antitrust liability, since the operative language of
the exemption states: "It shall not be unlawful under an)' antitrust law
for any person to propose, enter into, perform, or enforce the provisions
of any contract, agreement, or arrangement for any newspaper
combination or any joint newspaper operating arrangement .. ."61 If
the word "any" is given its normal meaning and the definitions of "joint
newspaper operating arrangement," "newspaper combination," and
"antitrust laws" are followed, it is readily apparent that the exemption is
one of total immunity from antitrust liability rather than the limited
exemption the sponsors claimed for the bill.
Following in the footsteps of other special interest legislation, 2 S.
1312 proposes to exempt previous transactions from antitrust liability.
Quite simply, S. 1312 provides that all final judgments and decrees in
civil cases against "newspaper combinations" and "joint newspaper
operating arrangements" holding them to be unlawful under any
antitrust law shall be "reopened and reconsidered" upon application of a
party to the arrangement or combination and its validity shall be
readjudicated under S. 1312.63 Pending civil and criminal actions against
"newspaper combinations" and "joint newspaper operating arrangements," where it is alleged that the combination or arrangement is un60. S. 1312, § 3(3).
61. S. 1312, § 4 (emphasis added).
62. See, e.g.. 12 U.S.C. § 1828(2) (Supp. 1967) (Bank Merger Act amendment of 1966).
One court has considered the impact of the retroactive application of the statute. See United States
v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 5 TRADE REG. REP. (1968 Trade Cas.) 72,332, at 84,903 (E.D.
Icy. Dec. 29, 1967).
63. S. 1312, § 5.
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lawful under "any antitrust law," are to be adjudged under the
standards of S. 1312 as well. By making S. 1312 retroactive, the
proponents of the measure raise several complicated constitutional
issues, as well as the unpopular spector of special interest legislation. The
most immediate constitutional issues, aside from the general due process
questions raised by retroactive legislation, are whether the legislation
violates the general principle of separation of powers by reopening
litigated judgments and whether the legislation deprives litigants of due
process by destroying vested causes of action and rights vested pursuant
to litigated and final judgments.6 1 While extended discussion of these
issues will not be attempted here, suffice it to say that the legislative
process is already suspected by many to be the bailiwick of special
interests. Passage of retroactive legislation for the obvious benefit of
special interests only confirms such suspicions.
S. 1312 presents a number of antitrust law and constitutional law
issues, as the above brief outline points out. Thus, even though the
process of analyzing the bill may be a rewarding method for reviewing
several areas of substantive law, the merit of S. 1312 is that it forces one
to grapple with vital matters of public policy and the future of the
expanding communications media. The hearings on S. 1312 proved to be
of major public significance, since they revealed a massive amount of
substantive information concerning the state of the communications
industry in general and newspapers in particular that heretofore has been
beyond public notice.
Iv.

THE HEARINGS ON S. 1312

The hearings on S. 1312 raised several major issues with regard to
competition in the newspaper business. The key question was the
recurring issue of whether the bill would grant immunity to newspaper
mergers and joint operating arrangements permitting predatory anticompetitive activity, or whther the bill would only amount to a limited
64. The closest case to the issues presented by S. 1312 is United States v. First Nat'l Bank &
Trust Co., 5 TRADE REG. REP. (1968 Trade Cas.)
72,332, at 84,903 (E.D. Ky. Dec. 29, 1967). The
Bank Merger Act of 1966 provides that "Any merger, consolidation, acquisition of assets, or
assumption of liabilities involving an insured bank which was consumated prior to June 17, 1963,
the bank resulting from which has not been dissolved or divided and has not effected a sale or
distribution of assets and has not taken any other similar action pursuant to a final judgment under
the antitrust laws prior to the enactment of this Act . . . .shall be conclusively presumed to have
not been in violation of any antitrust laws other than Section 2 of the [Sherman Antitrust Act]
.... " 12 U.S.C. § 1828 (Supp. II, 1967). The District Court in First Nat'l Bank & Trust avoided
the constitutional issues by holding that the litigation was not final when the Bank Merger Act was
passed, even though a decree ordering divestiture had been entered.
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exemption for activity otherwise subject to antitrust attack, not

including "predatory activity." Senator Hayden, chief sponsor of the
bill, took the position that the bill was an "exemption," equivalent to the
many exceptions heretofore enacted for regulated industries or other

fields of economic endeavor where competition has been assumed or
proved to be unworkable or impracticable." Senator Hayden's position

was supported by Arthur B. Hanson, general counsel of the American
Newspaper Publisher's Association (ANPA) 6 Mr. Hanson cited as
analogous exemptions from antitrust liability the Webb-Pomerene
Export Trade Act, 67 the Small Business Act of 1958,60 the Bank Merger
Act of 1966,69 and exemptions for pooled television broadcasting rights
in professional football.' Others mentioned the McCarren-Ferguson
exemption," exemptions for agricultural cooperatives, and the labor

exemptions. 2 Each of the exemptions cited are specifically limited either

by being narrowly defined to cover a specific type of conduct or by being

limited to extraterritorial effects, or by the fact that the particular
industry is otherwise affirmatively regulated by federal or state
administrative agencies. There is no limiting language on the scope of the

exemption in S. 1312, nor is their any quid pro quo in the form of
affirmative administrative regulation of predatory practices from price

fixing to price discriminations in return for the gift of antitrust
immunity. The argument was made that the exemption extended only to
the "act of combining by way of a joint arrangement or merger and the

jointness of the activities thereafter engaged in by the joint arrangement
or the merged companies. .

.

. The activities undertaken by the newly

formed entity would remain subject to the antitrust laws just as the
conduct of any other lawfully created entity is subject to the antitrust
laws." The simple answer to this proposition is that the bill immunizes
65. 1 Hearings 3-5, 445-49 (statement of Senator Hayden (D-Ariz.)).
66. Mr. Hanson's time was paid for by the ANPA, but his viewpoints, apparently, were not
intended to represent the official views of the Association, I Hearings 60, a posture some members
of the A N PA found both objectionable and con fusing, I Hearings 79.
67. 40 Stat. 516 (1918), as antended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 61-65 (1964). Seegenerally Pogue, WebbPomerene Export TradeAct, 33 ANTITRUST L.J. 105 (1967).
68. 15 U.S.C. §§ 631 et seq. (1964). See generally Schramm, Small Business, 33 ANTITRUST
L.J. 94 (1967).
69. 12 U.S.C. § 1828 (Supp. 11, 1967). See generally Hammond, The Philadelphia Nat'l
Bank Doctrine-A Verification, 36 ANTITRUST L.J. 13 (1967).
70. 75 Stat. 732 (1961), as anended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1291-93 (Supp. 1, 1967). See generally
Eppel, ProfessionalSports,33 ANTITRUST L. J. 69 (1967).
71. 59 Stat. 33 (1945), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-15 (1964). I Hearings 77 (statement
of P. Chumbris). Seegenerally Myrter & Gorman, Insurance, 33 ANTITRUST L. J. 28 (1967).
72. 1 Hearings 178-80 (statement of Prof. R. Day). See generally Noakes, Agricultural
Cooperatives, 33 ANTITRUST L.J. 7 (1967); Fried and Crabtree, Labor, Id. at 38.
73. I Hearings 190 (letter to the Committee by Prof. R. Day) (emphasis added).
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total merger or joint or common action for any or all commercial
activity engaged in by a modern newspaper and contains no language
limiting the scope of the exemption. Consequently; the argument that
predatory activities pursuant to a joint arrangement or merger are not
exempt from antitrust policy is incomprehensible, since the language
providing for exemption makes any joint arrangement for unified
activity embracing any or all commercial activity of the newspapers
involved "not. . . unlawful under any antitrust law. 71 4
A second major issue before the committee was a determination of
the economic health of the newspaper industry in general and of specific
newspapers in particular. The debate generally raged in the realm of
speculation and generalities, with few instances of specifics. Newspapers
have been generally exempt from income reporting requirements," and,
since most newspapers are close corporations and no annual reports to
stockholders are issued , there is no general fund of information with
regard to their financial affairs. Although several publishers made
unsubstantiated pleas of poverty or of increasing cost pressures upon
profit rates, the overall impact of the hearings established that most
newspapers are exceptionally profitable, that newspapers operated on a
joint arrangement basis are very profitable, and that monopoly town
newspapers are extremely profitable.
Indeed, it would be hard to understand how the general economic
health of the industry could be.other than good. Between 1945 and 1966,
daily newspaper circulation increased by almost 11 million, the total
number of pages in an average daily newspaper almost doubled,7 6 and
total newspaper revenues increased from 846 million dollars in 1939 to
3,458 million dollars in 1958."1 Advertising revenues alone totalled 4,876
million dollars in 1966.78 In an industry with a rapidly expanding
customer market, high barriers to entry, and consistent and high gains in
revenues it is difficult to believe that the industry in general is suffering
from a case of economic malnutrition. Indeed, an American Newspaper
Publisher's Association report on the state of the industry in April, 1967,
described "the unprecedented economic vigor of daily newspapers." 9
The economic vigor of joint agency and recently merged
newspapers, perhaps the key factual issue before the committee, was
74.
75.
Rivers).
76.
77.
78.
79.

S. 1312,§ 4.
1 Hearings 287-88 (statement of Prof. B. Rucker); I Hearings 388 (statement of Prof.
ANPA, Daily Newspapers in 1966 (April, 1967),published in I Hearings 513-15.
3 Hearings 1265 (statement of ITU).
ANPA, Daily Newspapers in 1966 (April, 1967), published in I Hearings511.
Id. at 509-27.
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never clearly established. However, several witnesses produced evidence
indicating the newspapers can be lucrative enough even to cause the drug
industry to be envious. Prices paid for large newspapers', and for small
newspapers"' indicate that buyers believe newspapers are an exceptional
investment. It was reported that a survey of a large daily, with an
average circulation of 240,000, and a medium daily, with a circulation of
50,000, showed the former had before-tax profits of 3,296,179 dollars or
a profit of 22 per cent of its total revenues, and that the latter had a
.before tax profit of 27 per cent of revenues and an after-tax profit of 14
per cent of revenues .12 The Times-Mirror Company, a diversified holding
company which owns the Los Angeles Times and has "large interests in
newspaper publishing, book publishing and commercial printing,""3
showed 1963 revenues of 196,537,000 dollars on 165,162,000 dollars of
total assets. 4 The Sun Company, owners and operators of daily
newspapers in San Bernardino, California, and the acquired company in
the aborted Times-Mirror merger case, s had total assets of 4,55 1,261
dollars and net income from its newspaper operations in 1964 that
"exceeded 1,000,000 dollars. 8 6 The International Typographical Union
reported that the Tucson Star and the Tucson Mirror, participants in a
joint agency venture and partners in the merger attacked by the Antitrust
Division 7 which led to the introduction of S. 1312, showed profits of
2,914,036 dollars on a total income of 8,170,780 dollars in 1963. "
It seems clear that proponents of the proposed legislation did not
carry the burden of establishing the central factual issue before the
committee-that the newspaper industry in general or in particular cases
is in ailing circumstances. If anything, the evidence submitted to the
committee indicated a marked reluctance by newspaper owners to
disclose detailed and independently audited profit statements and many
80. The Cleveland Plain Dealer was sold for $50 million and the New Orleans Times
Picayune was sold for $42 million to the Newhouse chain. The Chandler interests paid $15 million
for the San Bernardino Sun. I Hearings 115 (statement of the ITU).
81. A paper with 7,000 circulation in Athens, Georgia, was recently sold for $1.7 million. I
Hearings 115 (statement of the ITU).
82. I Hearings206 (statement of W. J. Farson).
83. United States v. Times-Mirror Co., 274 F. Supp. 606 (C.D. Cal. 1967), affdper curial,
390 U.S. 712 (1968). For a description of the Times Mirror Company's "large holdings," see 3
Hearings 1298-1301 (statement of the ITU).
84. 274 F. Supp. at 609. 1966 Profits of the Times-Mirror Company were reported to be
$18,455,500. I Hearings 170 (statement of ITU).
85. 274 F. Supp. at 609.
86. Id.
87. United States v. Citizen Publishing Co., 280 F. Supp. 978 (D. Ariz. 1968).
88. I Hearings 153.
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witnesses indicated that profits in the newspaper industry and related
enterprises are exceptionally high."
The third major issue bd'ore the committee was whether competing
newspapers could survive only in communities with over 650,000
population and whether joint agency operations were the only means for
maintaining two newspapers in communities with less than 650,000
population. Several subsidiary issues were also involved: the cause of the
demise of large urban dailies; the effects of newsprint and equipment
manufacturer prices; the evolution of printing, data transmission and
distribution technology; barriers to entry erected by restrictive wire
service and syndicated column practices; concentration of ownership of
other forms of communications media by newspaper owners; the growth
of chains; and predatory practices by existing newspapers against actual
and potential competitors.
No empirical research was produced to show the minimum market
capable of supporting two independent and competing daily newspapers.
Proponents of S. 1312 claimed 650,000 population as a minimum
market for newspaper competition; 0 opponents offered several instances
of much smaller markets supporting competing dailies." Proponents
offered several examples of large urban dailies failing in recent years;92
opponents countered with allegations that the failures were due to poor
management,93 failure to relate to citizens of the urban area,94
conspiratorial arrangements to divide markets, 95 illegal competitive
tactics by larger competitors, 96 or other conduct, thereby laying failure
on factors other than inherent lack of economic support.97 Out of the
89. I Hearings 387-407 (statement of Prof. W. L. Rivers).
90. I Hearings 44 (statement of A. Hanson); 2 Hearings883 (statement of J. Gallivan).
91. I Hearings 359 (statement of J. Flynn); I Hearings 371 (statement of G. Stipe); I
Hearings 291 (statement of Prof. B. Rucker).
92. 1 Hearings 47, 71 (statement of A. Hanson); 2 Hearings 592 (statement of G. 0.
Markuson).
93. I Hearings 308 (statement of B. Bagdikian); I Hearings 405 (statement of Prof. W. L.
Rivers).
94. Id.
95. I Hearings 201 (statement of W. J. Forson); I Hearings 416 (statement of B.
McNamara).
96. I Hearings 25 (statement of E. Cervi); 2 Hearings 915 (statement of F. J. Martin); I
Hearings 297, 315 (statement of N. Cherniss); 2 Hearings 634 (statement of J. H. Clinton); 2
Hearings 841 (statement of J. M. Cornwell). See also Kansas City Star Co. v. United States, 240 F.
2d 643 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 354 U.S. 923 (1957); Barber, Newspaper Monopoly In New Orleans:
The Lessonsfor Antitrust Policy, 24 LA. L. REv. 503 (1964).
97. Id. See also 2 Hearings 721 (statement of M.G. Dworkin); 2 Hearings 989 (statement of
W. Loeb). CJ. Greenspun v. McCarran, 105 F. Supp. 662 (D. Nev. 1952); Indiana Farmer's Guide
Pub. Co. v. Prairie Farmer Pub. Co., 293 U.S. 268 (1934).
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welter of conflicting testimony some facts clearly emerged. No
competent research has been done to establish a generally acceptable
figure indicating where a natural monopoly newspaper market begins
and a competitive market ends. Also it appeared that there is a shocking
degree of concentration in the communications industry in the United
States, and the government agencies-principally the Antitrust Division,
FCC and FTC-have done little to prevent or undo the concentration
which presently exists.9" Finally, it is evident that the newspaper industry
in particular and the communications industry in general are rich
sources of potential antitrust litigation in view of their concentrated
structure and anticompetitive tactics reminiscent of the captains of
industry of the nineteenth century.
The hearings before the Senate Antitrust and Monopoly
Subcommittee proved to be a public service, the potential dimensions of
which can be evaluated only from the hindsight provided by the passage
of time. It seems clear, however, that Senator Hart, the committee, the
committee staff, and unwittingly the sponsors of S. 13 12 have provided a
wealth of heretofore unknown, and perhaps suppressed, information
about the state of the Fourth Estate. The hearings evidently provided
enough adverse information to cause even the most zealous servants of
constituent interests to postpone further Senate action on S. 1312 in its
present form for the remainder of this session of Congress. It will be a
tragedy for freedom of speech and freedom of the press if government
action is limited to a negative response of burying the bill in committee.
The information revealed thus far indicates that the newspaper industry
together with the other forms of communication media need further
examination in the harsh glare of full publicity, and could use a healthy
dose of competition, a remedy most of them are continually advocating
for others but which few of them practice.
V.

CONCLUSION

The newspaper industry does have peculiar competitive problems.
The interrelationship of circulation and advertising and the almost total
dependence upon advertising revenue for economic success means that
newspaper publishing is an industry of increasing return. The greater the
circulation the more efficient the expenditure of advertising dollars, since
the buyer of space reaches a greater number of readers and the seller of
space need not make any additional expenditure of consequence once
98. See generally 3 Hearings 1276-96 (statement of ITU); I Hearings 281 (statement of Prof.

B.Rucker). See also M. ERNST,

THE FIRST FREEDOM

(1946).
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type and plate are set, to serve the larger circulation. Accordingly, once a
significant circulation gap opens between competing daily newspapers,
an irreversible trend is likely to set in, with advertisers going to the larger
circulation newspaper, assuming rates are relatively competitive, to
obtain the greatest efficiency in advertising expenditure. Consequently,
the best method of preserving competing dailies, where they still exist, is
to prevent the creation of a circulation gap of significant magnitude to
start the snowballing effect of advertisers rushing to the paper with the
largest circulation.
The cause of a circulation gap can arise from a myriad of factors.
Superiority of product in the minds of the consuming public is, of
course, the basic factor. Product superiority, however, does not
necessarily arise from laudatory performance. The hearings disclosed
that several newspapers gained a competitive edge by predatory
practices, by leverage gained from the ownership of other forms of media
in the same community, by exclusive contracts for syndicated features,
by resources derived from other members of a chain of newspapers, by
price digcrimination, and by unfair competitive advantages with large
advertisers. Insofar as preventing a gap from arising because of unfair
competitive tactics or power gained from deeper economic resources, it
would seem that judicial awareness of the interrelationship of advertising
and circulation in newspaper competition could have a salutary effect, if
a declining paper charged a larger competitor with an attempt to
monopolize under section 2 of the Sherman Act." In effect, such a claim
based on section 2 is a form of an "incipiency" charge,' and judicial
sensitivity to the advertising-circulation relationship to viable newspaper
competition should minimize the degree of evidence necessary to prove
an attempt to monopolize and minimize the degree of circulation gap
necessary to establish a trend toward monopolization. Proof of a circulation gap, or proof of a trend toward the creation of a circulation gap,
plus minimal evidence of predatory conduct, unfair trade practices, price
discrimination, or use of leverage from other product or geographic
markets should be sufficient to establish an attempt to monopolize in
violation of section 2 of the Sherman Act. Thus, in those cases where a
circulation gap is accompanied by any factor extrinsic to the legitimate
99.

15 U.S.C. § 2(1964).

100. See, e.g., Kansas City Star Co. v. United States, 240 F.2d 643 (8th Cir. 1957); Lorain
Journal Co. v. United States, 342 U.S. 143 (1951); United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100 (1948);
Eastman Kodak Co. v. Southern Photo Materials Co., 273 U.S. 359 (1927); Six Twenty-Nine
Productions, Inc. v. Rollins Telecasting, Inc., 365 F.2d 478 (5th Cir. 1966); Packaged Programs,
Inc. v. Westinghouse Broadcasting, Inc., 255 F.2d 708 (3d Cir. 1958); Gamco, Inc. v. Providence
Fruit& Produce Bldg., 1952 Trade Cas. 67,219 (IstCir. 1952).
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competitive capabilities of the protagonists, the firm with a smaller
circulation will have a potent weapon to deter the firm with a larger
circulation from pushing its advantage too far.
Antitrust policy should also be vigilant in those cases where a firm
with a smaller circulation is losing the competitive struggle because of its
own internal deficiencies. Acquisition by a competitor in the same
market, rather than by new investors in the community or outside
interests, can have undesirable effects. Where the competing paper has
acquired its competitor, future market entry is usually foreclosed, excess
machinery and equipment are either junked or removed from the scene
as far as possible to prevent their acquisition by potential local
competitors, combination rates are employed, and the community is left
with a single source for editorial viewpoints and a single source of news
from the printed media. If the acquiring firm also owns other forms of
media in the community, the economic, political, and social effects of the
acquisition are compounded. At the very least, antitrust policy should
prohibit a single newspaper in a community from owning other forms of
competing media, prevent the sale of excess equipment outside the
community, and prevent the use of combination rates.
Beyond this, Congress should investigate means of breaking the
advertising-circulation relationship, which gives great economic impetus
to the growth of a newspaper, enabling it to gain the upper hand in
circulation. Factors responsible for newspaper costs, particularly
newsprint and equipment costs, contribute heavily to the need for
newspapers to rely upon advertising for revenue. Paring newsprint and
equipment costs could alleviate the pressure to rely upon advertising
revenues to a limited extent. But a frontal attack must be made upon the
interrelationship of advertising and circulation, either by legislation
easing the standards for establishing monopolization in newspaper cases
or by mandatory equalization of advertising costs per exposure where
the disparity in circulation reaches a point that makes survival of the
newspaper with the smaller circulation marginal. Without some kind of
remedy for the advertising-circulation syndrome, continued concentration in the newspaper industry is unavoidable.',
101. 4 Hearings 1770; 2 Hearings953 (statement of J.R. Malone). Dr. Malone advances several proposals aimed at alleviating the anticompetitive effects of a circulation gap which drains a
smaller competitor of advertising revenue because of the inter-relationship of advertising and circulation. If Congress is seriously interested in preserving competing and independent editorial
voices, it should investigate the merits of Dr. Malone's proposals and enact legislation which would
regulate the revenue pressure caused by a circulation gap, rather than passing measures like S.
1312 which would eliminate all competition. In essence, a circulation advantage permits price

discrimination in advertisifig rates and it is usually compounded by volume discounts and price
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Finally, Congress must forcefully assert itself as guardian of the
public interest. The executive and administrative agencies charged with
this responsibility, particularly the FCC, 2 have failed to carry out
effectively their responsibility. In part, the failure of executive and
administrative agencies to preserve competition and prevent
concentration in the communications media is attributable to the
political power of the communications media, which in turn has
intimidated Congress. Ultimately, Congress, with its hands on the purse
strings and its political leverage on executive and administrative
agencies, must bear the responsibility for the present state of the
communications industry. Future efforts to restore competition to the
industry must begin with the rejection of S. 1312 and a congressional
willingness to provide adequate appropriations to executive and
administrative agencies. It is not too much to say that the time has come
for Congress to show some intestinal fortitude and protect the linchpin
of any democratic society from private domination by insuring a free,
competitive, and independent multitude of voices in the communications
industry. The electors should settle for no less; our future as a
democratic society is dependent in part upon a courageous and
meaningful stand by Congress in favor of decentralizing the
communications industry.' 3
discrimination between national, local, and classified ailvertising. At'the very least, the courts
should not follow the simplistic view of the economics of newspaper competition implicit in TimesPicayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594 (1953). See generally Barber, Newspaper
Monopoly in New Orleans: The Lessons For Antitrust Policy, 24 LA. L. REv. 503 (1964).
102. See generally Cox & Johnson, supra note 16; GOULDEN, MONOPOLY (1968); Drew, Is the
F.C.C. Dead?, THE ATLANTIC MONTHLY, July, 1967 at 29; Johnson, The Media Barons and the
Public Interest, THE ATLANTIC MONTHLY, June, 1968 at 43; Flackett, supra note 57.
103. See generally B.W. RUCKER, supra note 2; Symposium, Antitrust and Monopoly
Policy in the Communications Industry, 13 ANTITRUST BULL. 871 (1968).

